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Mishler: "Assistance of Counsel for His Defence": The Problem of Conflicts

Essays from the Bench and Bar
"ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS DEFENCE":
THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Jacob Mishler*
In all criminalprosecutions,the accusedshall enjoy the right...
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
-SXTH

AMENDMENT

The right to counsel developed as a colonial concept. English

law denied the right to counsel for defendants charged with
felonies until 1836.1 In theory, the judge, who was charged with
assuring a fair trial, was considered to be counsel for the defendant. During the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), moreover, persons accused of crimes were confined in secret with no opportunity
to prepare for trial.2 The only exception to the general denial of
the right to counsel was the Trial of Treasons Act, 3 enacted in
1696, which gave defendants charged with treason the right to
4
counsel and required the court to appoint counsel.

Under the Massachusetts Bay Charter, granted March 4, 1629,
control of the affairs of the Massachusetts Bay Company was transferred to the colonists. The charter gave the colonists the "[p]ower
to make laws to erect all sorts of magistracy, to correct, punish,

pardon, govern, and rule the people absolutely." 5 On December
10, 1641, the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted a "Body of Liberties." Among the rights guaranteed was the right to counsel:
* Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
1. W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955). In 1836,
English law gave all felony defendants an absolute right to counsel. See An Act for
enabling Persons indicted of Felony to make their Defence by Counsel or Attorney,
1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, §§ 1-3.
2. 1 J.STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 350 (1883).
3. See An Act for regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of
Treason, 1695-96, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1.
4. The Act provided procedural safeguards against the injustices which occurred in trials for treason during the reigns of Charles II and James II, see id.
§§ 1-5, 7-12. It also provided that the accused be given a copy of the indictment, id.
§ 1, and be permitted to compel production of witnesses, id. § 7. The judge's impartiality was questioned in such politically motivated trials, and thus his function as
defendant's counsel was impaired. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 355-56.

5. III The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws, at 1846-60 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
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Every man that findeth himself unfit to plead his owne
cause in any Court shall have Libertie to employ any man
against whom the Court doth not except, to helpe him, Provided
he give him noe fee or reward for his paines. This shall not
exempt the partie himselfe from Answering such Questions in
6
person as the Court shall thinke meete to demand of him.

The importance of this right was acknowledged by incorporating it
into the Constitution as a part of the Bill of Rights.
One of the more subtle issues involving the sixth amendment's
guarantee of assistance of counsel is the problem of conflict of interest. Conflicts of interest affecting the right to effective assistance

of counsel can arise from a variety of circumstances and relationships, such as:
(1) representation of multiple defendants who are related by
blood or marriage;
(2) representation of multiple defendants who have a business
relationship;
(3) representation of multiple defendants who are unrelated;
(4) representation of a single defendant and prior representation
of a Government witness;
(5) representation of a single defendant where codefendants are
represented by partners of the law firm;
(6) representation of a single defendant where codefendants are
represented by associates sharing the same facilities and secretarial services;
(7) representation of a single defendant, having come into possession of information through representation of a client whose
interest is adverse to that of the current client; and
(8) representation of a single defendant where the fee is paid by
a person having an adverse interest.
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with a con-

flict of interest in the representation of multiple defendants, the
Court held that the right to the assistance of counsel must include
the quality of representation that demands individual loyalty to a
client:
[W]e [are] clear that the "assistance of counsel" guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. If the
6. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, RITES RULES AND LIBERTIES CONCERNING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
26.
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right to the assistance of counsel means less than this, a valued
7
constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired.

The Court refused to conduct an inquiry into how much prejudice

the defendant sustained as a result of the conflict which it found to
have resulted from the dual representation, because "itlhe right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to

allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial." 8
The Court imposed upon the trial judge the duty to protect a
defendant's right to counsel. 9 Thus, the judge is required to con-

duct a hearing whenever a potential conflict of interest is apparent.' 0
The hearing is designed to inform the defendant of the potential

conflict and to afford him the opportunity to express his views on
the representation." The court is able to advise defendants of potential conflicts in, for example, multiple-defendant representation:

One defendant may take the witness stand and inculpate either
himself or a codefendant; the evidence may require a more favor-

able summation for one defendant to the detriment of the other;
one defendant may plead guilty during the trial and decide to
testify for the Government; cross-examination of a prosecution
witness may be restricted as to one defendant because it may be
damaging to the other. However, the court's inquiry carries with it
the risk of violating the privilege of confidentiality between attorney and client and/or intruding into the plan of defense.
7. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). In Glasser the trial court
directed Glasser's attorney to represent his codefendant who had dismissed counsel.
The attorney pointed out a possible conflict of interest and objected to the appointment.
8. Id. at 76 (citing McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 347 (1936);
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 292 (1930); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)).
9. Id. at 71. There is a concomitant duty imposed upon the lawyer by ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976) to refrain from representing multiple clients where there exists a potential for conflict of interest. See id. DR 5-105(A)
to (B); id. EC 5-14 to 5-15.
10. The Supreme Court recently observed that "courts have differed with respect to the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that
criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the effective assistance of
counsel by joint representation of conflicting interests." Holloway v. Arkansas, 46
U.S.L.W. 4289, 4291 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1978) (No. 76-5856) (citations omitted). See United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
11. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directing Edward Taylor to Appear
and Testify, No. 77-1353 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1977); Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d
236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir.
1976).
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Where defendants are represented individually by different
members of a law firm or by lawyers who are associated, the fact of
such partnership or association and the probability of the exchange
of information between lawyers by reason of their relationship
2
should be brought to the defendant's attention.1
The representation of a defendant by a lawyer who previously
represented a Government witness is troublesome. Often it works
to the defendant's advantage, and at times, the lawyer is not aware
of the conflict until the Government offers the witness at trial. The
knowing waiver of any claim of the attorney-client privilege by the
witness (the former client) avoids the problem. Where the witness
does not waive, however, the lawyer should turn the cross-examination over to a lawyer who is not privy to the witness's communications.
On the other hand, if the defendants themselves recognize
that the evidence is overwhelming against one of them and weak
against the others, should the court nonetheless advise the defendant, who is knowingly and voluntarily about to testify to his culpability and exculpate his codefendants, to seek other counsel? Although the right to assistance of counsel does not include an absolute
right to choose counsel, the court should not interfere unnecessarily
with a defendant's choice.13 Such interference would arise where
the court orders representation by independent counsel despite
an unquestioned valid election by the defendant to be jointly represented. It is well-settled that the right to the assistance of
counsel may be waived if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. 14 A logical concomitant of the right to waive the assistance of counsel is that a defendant "may waive the right to have
[his] retained counsel free from conflicts of interest."15 The only
12. At times, a notice of appearance is filed in the name of the attorney and not
in the name of the firm.
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directing Edward Taylor to Appear
and Testify, No. 77-1353, slip op. at 663, 673 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1977); Abraham v.
United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento,
524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
15. United States v. Annedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1975)). In a very recent case
decided by the Second Circuit involving a claim of prejudice by reason of joint representation in a state trial, Judge Mansfield, in a concurring opinion, stated: "Although we have not held that joint representation of two defendants in a criminal
case amounts to a per se denial of effective assistance of counsel, I view it as some-
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limitation on the right and the choice is where the waiver is not
16
knowing and voluntary.
An unusual conflict of interest case was presented in In re
GrandJury Subpoena Directing Edward Taylor to Appear and Testify. 1 7 In In re Taylor, the Government moved to disqualify Taylor's
lawyer from representing him in connection with his grand jury
appearance on the ground that a conflict of interest existed between such representation and the lawyer's previous representation
of the targets of the investigation.' 8 The Government claimed that
Taylor, who was related by business and family ties to the suspects,
had information which, when elicited before the grand jury, would
incriminate them. 19 It claimed that it was about to grant Taylor use
immunity and that retention of the same lawyer would result in
Taylor's refusal to testify even under a grant of immunity.20 The
district court granted the motion after an in camera inspection of an
affidavit submitted by the Government.
The issue on appeal was framed as "Taylor's constitutional
right to counsel of his choice." 2' In the course of its opinion, the
court referred to the "valuable rights of both appellant and [his
lawyer] . . . with respect to Taylor's right to counsel of his choice,
. . . his right to associate for the purpose of retaining legal representation, . . . and, the right of [his lawyer] to practice one's

chosen profession ....

"22

In reversing, the Second Circuit Court

thing to be frowned upon ......
Kaplan v. Bombard, No. 77-2034, slip op. at 1598
(2d Cir. Feb. 15, 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring). See also Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directing Edward Taylor to Appear and Testify, No. 77-1353, slip op. at 663, 673 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1977). The ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility appears to incorporate thip waiver notion. DR
5-105(C) states:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest
of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1976); see also id.
EC 5-16.
16. E.g., where a defendant through physical or psychological coercion or
threats of economic pressure is directed to engage counsel.
17. No. 77-1353 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1977).
18. Id., slip op. at 660-61.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 660, 663-64.
21. Id. at 662 (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
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of Appeals held that the motion was premature.2 3 It observed,
however:
A clash of interests, if any, has been created by the Government's desire to compel the appellant to give particular testimony before the grand jury. The Government possesses the
power to create such a "conflict" in all situations in which targets
of a grand jury investigation or defendants at trial are represented by a single attorney. This court has on numerous occasions declined to adopt a rigid "single representation" rule in
situations of actual, as well as potential conflict, in favor of allowing a client to retain counsel of his choice with full knowledge of
the potential adverse consequences of such representation. 24
The right to the assistance of counsel at every critical stage of
a criminal proceeding is a necessary adjunct to the protection of
other constitutional safeguards. The right is secure so long as the
court stands ready to oversee any impairment of this right resulting
from a lawyer's divided loyalty.
23. Id. at 664. The court concluded that a hearing on the conflict-of-interest
issue could be held only after Taylor had been questioned before the grand jury, had
been offered immunity, and had refused "on the advice of counsel to answer a proper
question." Id.
24. Id. at 673 (citations omitted). In the context of this case, the adverse consequences would be possible confinement for contempt if appellant had refused to
answer a proper question while under a grant of immunity. In the usual conflict-ofinterest case, the court is concerned with possible prejudice to the conduct of the
defendant's trial on substantive charges.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/13

6

